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Abstract 
            
The bursting of speculative bubble in the United States has triggered the international 
finance crisis. Signal of weak loan growth and slowdown in major economies starting 
to impact Malaysia. This study intends to show the trend of the risk indicators and 
opportunity during financial crisis. The relationship among Non-Performing Loans 
ratio, Loan-to- Deposit ratio, loan growth rate, GDP growth rate and Composite Index 
has been tested. Besides that, the past trends of Non-Performing Loan ratio, Loan-to- 
Deposit ratio, loan growth rate, GDP growth rate and Composite Index have been 
analysed. Most risks are built up during financial booming and only materialise when 
economy hits downturn. Kuala Lumpur Composite Index shows the past financial 
crises ended in ways to create opportunities to the economy. Our banking system now 
is much stronger than the Asian Financial Crisis 1997, as evidenced by the low Non 
Performing Ratio and relative low Liquidity Ratio, to confront the current financial 
crisis. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the recent financial crises in United States, the global economy continues 
to be in havoc, i.e. global investment bank Lehman Brothers Holding Inc, financial 
advisory company Merill Lynch & Co Inc and AIG, USA’s largest insurance 
company, have become one of the hottest and worrying news to the world in the 3Q 
2008. According to IMF, the world economy is now entering a major downturn in the 
face of the most dangerous shock in mature financial markets since the 1930s.  
 
 Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER) executive director Datuk 
Dr Mohamed Ariff Abdul Kareem commented that “the picture looks more severe 
than it appeared at first” and that MIER may be revising its forecast of 3.4% gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth for 2009 to less than 3%. Mohamed Ariff was 
speaking to reporters after the MIER National Economic Outlook conference 2009-
2010 on 2 December 2008. 
       
2.0 OBJECTIVES 
 
The objectives of this study are:  
 
(i) To establish relationship between Non-Performing Loans (NPL) ratio and 
Composite Index (CI), Loan-Deposit (LD) ratio, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth, Consumer Price Indicator (CPI) and Loan Growth Rate through 
correlation analysis. 
 
(ii) To identify the risks and opportunities that rose in the Malaysia banking industry, 
during the previous financial crisis 1997, and the timing of the risks or 
opportunities occurred during financial crisis. Not much literature on the risks and 
opportunities during financial crisis is available, and most studies have been done 
on the causes of the financial crisis or the measures taken to solve the financial 
crisis. Therefore, this paper attempts to fill some of the gaps.  
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 Regarding the risk and opportunity arising from financial crisis, we examine: 
 
(a) Credit risk: the Non-performing Loans (NPL) ratio of the banking industry during 
financial crisis. 
(b) Liquidity risk: the Loan to Deposits (LD) ratio of the banking industry during 
financial crisis.  
(c) Opportunity: the Composite Index (CI) of Bursa Malaysia.    
(d) The likelihood of credit crunch to take place during the financial crisis. 
(e) Whether the NPLs ratio will increase significantly and immediately upon the 
occurrence of financial crisis.  
(f) Whether the risks arising from financial crisis will turn out to be opportunities to 
the industry / economy. 
 
 To provide a clearer picture on the trend of the NPL, loan growth and LD ratio in 
the analysis, the past trend of these variables have also been studied. Statistics for the 
period from 1997 to 1999 have been sourced and analysed. The remainder of this 
paper is structured as follows. Section 3 discusses the literature and arguments 
relating to financial crisis, risks and opportunities. Section 4 describes the 
methodology of study and the data used in this study. Section 5 presents the empirical 
results. Section 6 discusses on contribution of the study and Section 7 concludes. 
Finally, Section 8 states the limitation of the study. 
 
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW   
 
3.1 Definition of Financial Crisis 
 
According to Deardorff's Glossary of International Economics (University of 
Michigan),  financial crisis is referring to a loss of confidence in a country's currency 
or other financial assets causing international investors to withdraw their funds from 
the country. Chen (2009)’s in-sample and out-sample forecasting have shown that 
among the macro variables that in the consideration of the study, inflation rates is one 
of the most useful predictors of recessions in the US stock market. Therefore, 
Consumer Price Indicator is also used in the study as one of the indicator which is 
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linked to financial crisis. 
 
3.1.1 Global financial crisis 2007 - 2008 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 began in July 2007 (Laeven & Valencia, 
2008), when a loss of confidence by investors in the value of securitised mortgages in 
the United States resulted in a liquidity crisis which prompted a substantial injection 
of capital into financial markets by the United States Federal Reserve and the 
European Central Bank. The perceived credit risk in the general economy spiked up 
in July 2007, remained volatile for a year, and then spiked even higher in September 
2008. Although United States’s subprime crisis is often cited as having caused the 
financial crisis, the financial system was vulnerable because of intricate and 
overleveraged financial contracts and operations. 
 
3.1.2 Asian Financial Crisis 1997 
 
The Asian Financial Crisis was a period of financial crisis that gripped much of Asia 
beginning in July 1997, and raised fears of a worldwide economic meltdown 
(financial contagion). It started in Thailand with the collapse of Thai Baht, caused by 
the decision of Thai government to float the Baht. Before the crisis, Malaysia’s KLSE 
activity was regularly the most active stock exchange in the world, with KLSE 
Composite Index of above 1,200 in the beginning of 1997. In July 1997, within days 
of the Thai Baht devaluation, the Malaysian Ringgit was also attacked by speculators, 
causing the overnight rate jumped from 8 to 40%. By end of 1997, KLSE fell to 
below 600. The country went into the recession in 1998 with negative GDP growth of 
11.2% in 4Q 1998. 
  
3.2 The Cause of the Global Financial Crisis 
 
In both Japan and United States, falling asset prices, especially in real estate, were 
major triggers of the financial crisis. The increase in banks’ lending activity directed 
toward real estate partly reflected the decline in their traditional core business of 
lending to established nonfinancial companies. Meanwhile, deregulation has fostered 
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the transformation of banks’ portfolios, as banks were allowed to lend to riskier 
customers, and hold riskier assets (Dekle, 2002)[1]. 
  
The bursting of a speculative bubble in the US real estate market triggered the 
international finance crisis. At the end of 2006, key interest rates began rising in the 
US. Demand sank and real estate prices began to slump. This created a situation in 
which a growing number of subprime borrowers were no longer able to make their 
interest payments. In order to refinance themselves, mortgage companies often 
bundled their loans with new forms of subprime bonds that were sold to investors 
worldwide, e.g. to Chinese and European banks. The bundled loans include bad 
mortgage loans were securitised and turned into assets that could be traded on stock 
markets. Due to the inability to assess the risk of the asset, buyer had to rely on the 
rating assigned to it by a rating agency.  
 
3.3     Impact of Financial Crisis  
 
3.3.1 Credit risk  
 
Resulting from the non-performing loans, banking industry will be suffering severe 
losses. Sufiana (2009) states that, one of the main causes of banking crisis is the rapid 
rise of non-performing loans. Over the last quarter of the 20th century, both 
developed and developing countries have experienced severe banking crisis (Chile, 
Argentina, and Mexico, 1980s; Sweden, 1990s; Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, 
Philippines and Indonesia, 1997; Paraguay, 1995−1998; Russia, 1998; Turkey, 1994, 
2000, and 2001; Argentina, 2001). [2 ] The main causes of these crises are poor 
banking practices and lack of revenue diversification, inadequate capital, 
shortcomings in the assessment of credit risk, lending to connected enterprises, 
                                                          
1
 Dekle (2002) pointed that one of the most important issues in international finance of Japan in the 
1990s and today is the weakness in the Japanese financial system. Japanese banks have been saddled 
with NPLs, owing to the late 1980s burst of the property bubble. These problems in the banking 
system have led to a contraction in bank lending, worsening Japan’s recent economic downturn.  
2
  According to Sufiana (2009), the main causes of these crises are poor banking practices and lack of 
revenue diversification, inadequate capital, shortcomings in the assessment of credit risk, lending to 
connected enterprises, excessive maturity or currency mismatches, and rapid rise of non-performing 
loans. 
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excessive maturity or currency mismatches, and rapid rise of non-performing loans. 
 
3.3.2 Liquidity risk 
 
Lopez (2008) defines liquidity as the ability of a financial firm to meet its debt 
obligations without incurring unacceptably large losses. An example is a firm 
preferring to repay its outstanding one-month commercial paper obligations by 
issuing new commercial paper instead of by selling assets. Financial firms are 
especially sensitive to funding liquidity risk[3] since debt maturity transformation (for 
example, funding longer-term loans or asset purchases with shorter-term deposits or 
debt obligations) is one of their key business areas.  
 
 Asset securitisation is a form of liquidity management carried out using asset 
sales, but it is different from the use of liquidity reserves (Lopez, 2008).   Depending 
on the business model, securitization proceeds can be used for ongoing funding of a 
business line or as a way to meet future funding needs. The sharp drop in investor 
demand for asset-backed securities since August 2007 has caused this potential 
source of funding to become more scarce and costly. 
 
 Study done by Wagner (2007) shows that an increased liquidity of bank assets, 
paradoxically, increases banking instability and the externalities associated with 
banking failures. This is because even though higher asset liquidity directly benefits 
stability by encouraging banks to reduce the risks on their balance sheets and by 
facilitating the liquidation of assets in a crisis, it also makes crises less costly for 
banks. As a result, banks have an incentive to take on an amount of new risk that 
more than offsets the positive direct impact on stability. 
 
3.3.3 Opportunities 
 
Opportunities could arise from the financial crisis, either directly or indirectly. A well 
managed corporation would turn the financial crisis into opportunities by 
                                                          
3
 “Funding liquidity risk” is the risk that a firm will not be able to meet its current and future cash flow 
and collateral needs, both expected and unexpected, without materially affecting its daily operations or 
overall financial condition. 
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implementing the right financial decision.  In order to solve financial crisis, especially 
for a corporation, Chong & Escarraz (1998) has suggested using a six-stage model for 
crisis planning. The acronym CRISIS may be used to more vividly describe the model, 
i.e. Coping, Rethinking, Initiating, Sensing, Intervening and Sandbagging. [4]  
  
Fong (2008) comments that, 10 years ago, over-leveraging and financing 
mismatches were the main causes of the financial crisis. Shareholders and creditors of 
companies, like Renong group (now known as UEM), Technologies Resources 
Industries Bhd (better known as TRI) and Lion group were forced to take hair cuts to 
restructure the companies’ massive borrowings. However, the scenario is different a 
decade later.  RAM Holdings Bhd’s chief economist Dr Yeah Kim Leng says the 
sustainable average GDP growth of about 6% since 2000 should have enabled 
companies to accumulate some retained earnings to weather the storm. Lower 
corporate borrowings are also reflected in Malaysia’s corporate debt-to-GDP ratio, 
which has slid to about 45% currently from 148.4% in 1998. In fact, almost 40% of 
the companies having learnt their lessons during the financial crisis are in net cash 
positions. Interestingly, some companies that were burdened with debt 10 years ago 
are now sitting pretty on a pile of cash. Being cash rich, these companies can seize 
any good business opportunities quickly and at times, cheaply. 
 
 According to Economy Report 2000/2001 (Malaysia Treasury, Ministry of 
Finance, 2001), Malaysian economy rebounded strongly in 2000 after recovering 
from the sharp output decline in 1998 and early 1999 following the financial crisis. 
Economic turnaround, which began in the second quarter of 1999, has since become 
well-entrenched, underpinned by the return of confidence and a more stable economic 
environment made possible by the introduction of selective capital controls and the 
                                                          
4
 Coping: When a crisis hits a company, damages are bound to occur. The company has to grip with 
the crisis. Rethinking：A company that has survived a crisis needs to assess on all the events that led 
to the crisis. Initiating: Having been through a crisis, especially when it involved unprecedented, 
gigantic loss of financial, physical, technological, and human assets, most of these companies will not 
resist the idea of initiating an organized effort to build a workable crisis management program. Sensing: 
Managers should keep their eyes and ears open to look for signals, faint and illusive as though they 
may seem, that presage a crisis. Intervening: After reliable signals have been picked up at the sensing 
stage, managers may find it necessary to follow up with a “nip-it-in-the-bud” approach in executing a 
set of intervention strategies to prevent a potential crisis from gaining momentum. Sandbagging: Crisis 
resembles a river overflowing its banks and therefore sandbagging is needed for flood control.   
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pegging of the ringgit. The economic recovery is reflected by the real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) registered a growth of 10.3% in the first half of 2000, based on 
growth of 11.9% in the first quarter and 8.8% in the second quarter. Opportunities 
surged when KLCI began to pick up in October 2000 to close at 766.18 points on 16 
October. [5]  
 
3.4 Background of Malaysian Banking Sector Performance 
 
The banking sector remained resilient, supported by strong capitalisation, sustained 
profitability and continued improvement in the level of non-performing loans (NPLs). 
As at end-September, capitalisation level remained high with risk-weighted capital 
ratio (RWCR) of 13%. Net NPLs based on 3-month classification was RM36,059 
Million to account for 2.4% of total net loans. Given their sound balance sheets and 
ample liquidity in the financial system, banking institutions remained well positioned 
to continue meeting the financing needs of the economy. 
 
Table 1: Key Statistics of Banking Sector as at September 2008 
Total Risk Weighted Assets RM889,824.1 Million  
Total Deposits RM942,169.4 Million  
Total Loans RM712,720.6 Million  
Total NPL (based on 3-month classification) RM  36,059.0 Million  
Local:       9 Number of Commercial Banks 
Foreign:  13 
Total : 22 
Local:     14 Number of Investment Banks 
Foreign:    1 
Total: 15 
Local   : 11 Number of Islamic Banks 
  Foreign:   6 
Total:  17 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia 
 
 
                                                          
5
 During the period 4 January to 16 October 2000, KLCI declined 8% while sharper declines were 
registered in other regional bourses, namely the Stock Exchange of Thailand Index (-48.2%), Korean 
Composite Index (-48%), the Jakarta Composite Index (-41.2%), the Philippines Composite Index (-
40%) and the Singapore Straits Times Index (-26%). 
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4.0 METHODOLOGY OF STUDY 
From the earlier introduction, we can observe that credit risk and liquidity risk are 
vulnerable to banking industry. This study intends to compare the risk indicators and 
opportunity indicator during financial crisis 1997. Risk indicators are NPL and LD 
ratios whereas opportunity indicator is CI. The indicators represent the quarterly 
statistic for the period from 1997 to 1999. Correlation of the indicators has been 
studied in order to ascertain the relationship of NPL ratio, LD ratio, Loan growth rate, 
CI, GDP growth rate and CPI. Besides, trend analysis has been adopted to show the 
performance and movement of the said indicators. 
  
5.0 FINDINGS 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2: Statistics of the indicators for Jan1997 – Dec 1999               
  1997 1998 1999 Highest Lowest 
NPL ratio  (%)   4.5 13.4 11.1 14.9 3.2 
Loan growth rate (%) 5.9 -0.6 -0.3 6.3 -2.3 
Loan-Deposits ratio (%) 97.2 96.1 87.7 100.4 87.7 
GDP growth rate (%) 6.1 -11.2 10.8 10.8 -11.2 
CI      594 586.1 812.3 1270.7 302.9 
CPI 2.9 5.3 2.5 6.2 1.6 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia 
 
Table 3: Statistics of the indicators for Jan 2007 – Oct 2008            
  2007 2008 Highest Lowest 
NPL ratio  (%)   3.2 2.4 4.7 2.4 
Loan growth rate (%) 1.7 4.3 4.8 1.3 
Loan-Deposits ratio (%) 74.2 76.6 77.9 71.3 
GDP growth rate (%) 7.3 4.7 7.3 4.7 
CI      1445 863.6 1445 863.6 
CPI 2.4 7.6 8.5 1.4 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia 
 
Table 2 and 3 above are summarised from the data collected from Bank Negara for 
the period from 1997 to 1999 and the period from 2007 to 2008 respectively, which 
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have been used in this study to show the risks and opportunities during financial crisis. 
The highest and the lowest figure for each indicator are taken from the monthly (for 
NPL ratio, Loan-Deposits ratio, CI and CPI) and quarterly (for Loan growth rate and 
GDP growth rate) report from Bank Negara.  
 
The relationship between the above indicators, i.e. NPL ratio, Loan growth rate, 
Loan-Deposit ratio, GDP growth rate, CI and CPI will also be studied in the next 
section.  
 
5.2 Correlation 
 
Table 4: Correlation of the indicators for the period from 1997 to 1999 
 
 
Based on Correlation Table above, p < 0.05 for correlation between NPL and CI. This 
reflects that negative correlation between NPL ratio and CI is significant. During the 
economy crisis 1997, the NPL ratio was on increasing trend while CI was on the 
downward trend. This shows that there is higher credit risk during the crisis. This 
result implies that during slowdown in economy, whereby there will be less economy 
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activities and CI drops correspondingly, borrowers will have less income to repay 
their loans. Therefore, higher risk of default. 
    
P > 0.05 for the correlation between NPL ratio and LD ratio shows that NPL ratio 
is having weak negative correlation with LD ratio. This shows that when NPL ratio is 
moving upwards, LD ratio is moving downwards, but at a lower rate of changes. This 
could be due to smaller Loan growth but higher Deposits growth during financial 
crisis, while the NPL ratio is increasing. 
 
 
P> 0.05 shows insignificant negative correlation between NPL ratio and GDP 
growth. This shows weak negative correlation between these 2 indicators; when the 
GDP is growing positively, NPL ratio is on declining trend, albeit at a slower pace. 
This implies that NPL ratio is relatively lower when economy is booming as the 
borrowers have sufficient capacity to repay their loans. 
 
NPL ratio has weak positive correlation with CPI as shown by p>0.05. This 
implies that CPI has little impact on NPL ratio. However, when the CPI is on the high 
side, it will also impact the buying power or cost of living of the borrowers, which 
resulting in higher NPL ratio. 
 
P = 0.00 for the correlation between NPL and Loan growth shows the strong 
negative correlation between these 2 indicators. There are few reasons to explain this 
strong correlation. First, there is likelihood of credit crunch to take place when NPL 
ratio is growing. Second reason will be: when there are more loans offered during 
economy booming, borrowers have higher ability to pay, therefore, lower NPL rate. 
Another reason could be: more good loans have been granted when the Loan growth 
is expanding, hence, NPL ratio is moving downwards. 
  
 From all the variables considered in the study of Bonfirm (2009), GDP growth 
rate seems to be the most important (with a negative contemporaneous impact on 
default probabilities, the coincident economic activity indicator (which also evaluates 
economic conditions), loan growth (which also displays a negative coefficient) and, 
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finally, stock market prices variation (implying that positive developments in stock 
market prices, which usually reflect an improvement in firms’ financial conditions, 
are associated with lower default probabilities). All these variables display relatively 
high marginal effects on default probabilities, showing that macroeconomic 
conditions are very important in explaining default probabilities. 
 
5.3 Credit Risk 
 
Figure 1a: Banking Industry NPL, Loan Growth Vs. GDP Growth (1997 to 1999) 
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Similar to the previous financial crisis, the industry NPLs ratio of 3.2% in March 
1997 was the lowest for the period from 1988 to 1997, before it started to climb up in 
Dec 1997. Corresponded to the CI which started to fall in Aug 1997, the NPL ratio 
was moving upwards since Dec 1997, to 8.9% in June 1998, until it hit the peak at 
14.9% in Nov 1998. While the NPL is on the high side, the country had faced 
recession in 1998 with highest negative GPD growth of 11.2% recorded in Dec 2008. 
Therefore, during financial crisis, especially when the country is facing recession, risk 
of NPL for banking industry is high as the borrowers are not able to honour their 
financial obligations due to poor economy situation. 
 
 The current global financial crisis started in July 2007, however it does not give 
much impact to the Malaysian economy in the same year. Sign of slowdown in GDP 
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growth was shown only in the 2Q2008, whereby the GDP growth rate has started to 
decline from 7.6% (1Q2008) to 6.7% (2Q2008) and 4.7% (3Q2008). The GDP is 
expected to decline further as Bernama (2008) reported that Malaysia’s GDP growth 
is forecast at 4% in 2009, based on a study done by economists of Allianz Dresdner 
Economic Research. NPL rate has not shown sign of deteriorating; in fact it is on 
gradual reducing mode. No region is immune to financial crisis, therefore we are 
unable to conclude that the NPL is not affected by the crisis at this juncture. Issue of 
time lag could be the reason that there is no immediate negative impact of financial 
crisis on NPL rate. (Refer to Figure 1b in the Appendix) 
 
 The results obtained from the study done by Bonfirm (2009) suggest that there are 
some important links between credit risk and macroeconomic developments; in 
periods of economic growth, which are sometimes accompanied by strong credit 
growth, there may be some tendency towards excessive risk-taking, i.e. most risk is 
built up during upturns, when banks apply looser credit standards, and most of the 
risk materialises only when the economy hits a downturn. Pederzoli and Torricelli 
(2005) also argue that high default rates during recessions are just a materialisation of 
the risk that is built up during expansions, most notably when strong economic 
growth is accompanied by the creation of unsustainable financial imbalances, and the 
imbalances created in such periods only become apparent when economic growth 
slows down. 
 
5.4 Liquidity Risk 
 
Financial market events since August 2007 have highlighted the prevalence and 
importance of liquidity risk for all types of financial firms. Liquidity risk 
management is a necessary component of a firm-wide risk management system. Even 
though the challenges in establishing and maintaining such a system are substantial, 
serious efforts by firms, their counterparties, and their supervisors in addressing these 
issues are critical.  
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Table 5: LD ratio for the period from Jan 1997 to Dec 1998  
As at LD ratio  As at LD ratio 
Jan, 97 0.9353  Jan, 98 0.9920 
Feb, 97 0.9431  Feb, 98 0.9853 
Mar, 97 0.9546  Mar, 98 0.9786 
Apr, 97 0.9605  Apr, 98 0.9881 
May, 97 0.9734  May, 98 0.9912 
Jun, 97 0.9611  Jun, 98 0.9985 
Jul, 97 0.9644  Jul, 98 0.9940 
Aug, 97 0.9671  Aug, 98 0.9981 
Sep, 97 0.9855  Sep, 98 0.9959 
Oct, 97 0.9986  Oct, 98 1.0044 
Nov, 97 1.0037  Nov, 98 0.9986 
Dec, 97 0.9718  Dec, 98 0.9611 
 
For the period from Jan 1997 to Dec 1998, the LD ratio for 1997-1998 is high, i.e. in 
the region of 0.9353 (Jan 1997) to 1.004 (Oct 1998). Therefore, it shows a high 
reliance of the banks on borrowed funds, which are generally more costly than most 
types of deposits. (Refer to Figure 2a in Appendix) 
 
Table 6: LD ratio for the period from Jan 2007 to Oct 2008 
As at LD ratio  As at  LD ratio 
Jan, 07 0.7190  Jan, 08 0.7287 
Feb, 07 0.7145  Feb, 08 0.7289 
Mar, 07 0.7146  Mar, 08 0.7247 
Apr, 07 0.7145  Apr, 08 0.7180 
May, 07 0.7131  May, 08 0.7282 
Jun, 07 0.7312  Jun, 08 0.7373 
Jul, 07 0.7573  Jul, 08 0.7387 
Aug, 07 0.7684  Aug, 08 0.7582 
Sep, 07 0.7733  Sep, 08 0.7565 
Oct, 07 0.7700  Oct, 08 0.7663 
Nov, 07 0.7788    
Dec, 07 0.7415     
 
 As compared to the previous financial crisis in 1997, the LD ratio as at 
Oct 2008 of 76.6% is deemed good, e.g. for every RM1-00 deposits that the bank 
receive, it will lend out RM0-77 to its borrower. Therefore, it will still have the buffer 
of RM0-23 to cushion for liquidity purpose. In fact, Malaysia’s LD ratio is among the 
lowest in the region. Figure 2b in the Appendix shows that the LD ratio remained on 
an upward trend since April 2008. Liquidity in the domestic financial system remains 
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ample as evidenced by the accommodative LD ratios and the loan growth rate of 
4.3% for 3Q2008 as compared to 2Q2008. This shows that the financial institutions 
have sufficient liquidity to fund their lending activities. 
 
5.5 Opportunity – Opening a new cycle 
 
Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates was not concerned about the state of the U.S. 
economy in the long run (Farber, 2008). Historical data would support his longer-
term view, but that will not make the current disarray and uncertainty about the 
economy any less scary for investors riding the daily, nausea-inducing roller coaster. 
 
 
 No doubt that Malaysia economy will be impacted by the global economy crisis 
as our trading partners, i.e. the United States, Europe, Japan, India and China are 
affected by the crisis, however, the country is not heading towards recession. The 
government is forecasting a GDP growth of 4%, which is a slower growth, instead of 
negative growth. 
 
 Based on the past trend on the KLCI, the index has weathered 2 cycles of 
financial crisis. These 2 cycles have shown upward trend, reflecting economy 
recovering after they slump to the bottom of the cycles. During the previous economy 
crisis, the KLCI went down to as low as 302.91 points (Aug 1998) from 814.57 points 
(September 1997). However, the Index was picking up slowly resulting from the 
measures taken by the Government in recovering the economy. 
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Figure 3: Performance of CI  / KLCI from 1989 to 2008 
 
 
  “All financial crisis end-and when they end, they end in ways to create specular 
opportunity” – quote from Lawrence Summers, the Head of the new US National 
Economic Council on how to deal with the financial crisis. Unavoidably, financial 
crisis may pose risks to an industry or corporation; it is the corporation’s judgement 
call to make the right financial decision and turnaround the risks to opportunities. The 
lowly leveraged corporation with high competitive positions are more resilient in 
confronting the current crisis. 
  
Warren E. Buffett said, “Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when 
others are fearful.” Certainly, fear is now widespread, gripping even seasoned 
investors. According to him, investors are right to be wary of highly leveraged 
entities or businesses in weak competitive positions. But fears regarding the long-
term prosperity of the nation’s many sound companies make no sense. These 
businesses will indeed suffer earnings hiccups, as they always have. But most major 
companies will be setting new profit records 5, 10 and 20 years from now. 
  
5.5.1 Measures to improve economy during the last financial crisis in 1997/98   
 
In September 1998, the Ringgit was moved from a free float to a fixed exchange rate 
regime. Bank Negara the ringgit at 3.8 to the dollar. With capital controls in place, the 
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government pursued expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate the 
economy in 1999. Loan growth rate had increased from -1.26% (Dec 1998) to 0.3% 
(Nov 1999), with NPL ratio decreased gradually from 13.4% (Dec 1998) to 11.7% 
(Nov 1999) as the as the economy continues to recover. Besides, the government has 
made considerable progress in cleaning up the banking sector by NPL purchases and 
capital injections. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd, the asset management 
company which was set up in 1998 to purchase and rehabilitate the banking sector’s 
bad debt, acquired around 35% of NPLs and began disposing of these assets. The 
company has taken over NPLs amounting to RM45.5 billion as at the end of 
December, 1999 (Xinhua English Newswire, 2000).    
 
 In the recovery of economy, Aghion et al (2004) suggested that a policy of 
allowing insolvent banks to fail may in fact prolong the slump if it restricts firms’ 
ability to borrow (because of the comparative advantage of banks in monitoring 
firms’ activities). Moreover, to the extent that the government has to spend resources 
on restructuring and cleaning-up after a spate of bankruptcies, it should avoid raising 
taxes during a slump since doing so would further limit the borrowing capacity of 
domestic entrepreneurs and therefore delay the subsequent recovery. 
 
5.5.2 Measures taken to improve economy in 2008 
 
Business Times (2008) commented that a combination of monetary and fiscal 
measures will be more prudent to protect the economy from a global meltdown and 
with inflationary pressures easing. 
 
 Given the heightened downside risks to growth and the diminishing inflationary 
pressures, the Overnight Policy Rate (OPR) was reduced by 25 basis points on 24 
November by Bank Negara as a pre-emptive measure aimed at providing a more 
accommodative monetary environment. Besides, the Statutory Reserve Requirement 
(SRR) was also reduced from 4% to 3.5%, with effect from 1 December 2008 to 
further reduce the cost of intermediation. The rate cut in OPR and Base Lending Rate 
(BLR) will be benefiting the lower to medium income groups. The additional cash 
flow from lower existing loan repayment could slightly ease the burden on the lower 
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and medium income households and restore their confidence in facing the economic 
downturn. Bank Negara Malaysia has also introduced 2 financing schemes, i.e. SME 
Assistance Facility and SME Modernisation Facility in August 2008 to the Malaysian 
Small and Medium Scale Enterprise (SMEs) to assist the SMEs to ride through the 
tough time of the crisis.  
 
 Besides the RM7 Billion fiscal stimulus plan introduced by the government early 
November 2008, the government has also further lowered fuel prices to speed up its 
price reduction campaign for other goods in battling inflation in order to reduce the 
society’s burden.     
 
5.6 Risks and Opportunities 
 
With increased uncertainty prevailing in the global economic outlook and in the 
financial, the potential risk for banking industry will be credit risk. Although in the 
analysis for the period from Jan 2007 to Oct 2008 has not shown immediate impact 
on the NPL ratio in the Malaysian banking system, the actual NPL will surface later. 
This is because the risk that is built up during economic expansion will only 
materialize when economic growth slows down. 
 
 
 Despite a weakening outlook for our economy, liquidity risk, however, is not a 
cause of concern for Malaysian banking industry. Comparing to the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, the LD ratio as at Oct 2008 of 76.6% is deemed good. The LD ratio 
was high during the period from 1997 to 1998, i.e. in the region of 0.9353 (Jan 1997) 
to 1.004 (Oct 1998), showing high reliance of the banks on borrowed funds. 
Therefore the current liquidity in the domestic financial system remains ample as 
evidenced by the accommodative LD ratios and the loan growth rate. 
 
 Nonetheless, there are several downside risks which could derail the growth 
momentum of the world economy. These include higher unemployment rate[6],  
                                                          
6
 The International Labour Organization predicted that at least 20 million jobs will have been lost by 
the end of 2009 due to the crisis - mostly in “construction, real estate, financial services, and the auto 
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lower-than-expected growth of the US economy (which impacts other trade-partner 
companies, a prolongation of the subprime mortgage crisis, widening global 
imbalances, earlier oil price shocks leading to higher world inflation. Resulting from 
these downside risks, Malaysia GDP growth rate and CI have started to move 
downwards.  
  
 No doubt that signs of moderation in growth have surfaced in the emerging 
economies, investors who have liquidity may wish to take the opportunity to make 
investment when the property prices are down during economy crisis. Besides, there 
are also investment opportunities in the stocks market when the CI turns low. Blue 
chips could be very cheap for investor to achieve good long term gain. 
 
 Going forward, the deterioration of the global financial environment has begun to 
have an adverse impact on global economic activity, with several major developed 
economies sliding into a recession. Malaysia’s better resilience lies in the established 
strong fundamentals that have been built-up over several years. The continued 
significant current account surplus, low external debt, large international reserves and 
well-capitalised banking system, will place the economy in a stronger position to 
weather this challenging period.  
 
6.0 CONTRIBUTION 
 
The findings of this study contribute to the literature on several dimensions. Firstly, 
correlation has been tested to show the relationship between NPLs ratio, LD ratio, 
GDP growth and KLCI. Secondly, trend analysis has been adopted to provide an 
insight on the movement of NPLs ratio, LD ratio, GDP growth and KLCI during the 
previous and present financial crisis. Most of the analyses conducted have focused on 
the credit risk and liquidity risk during financial crisis.  As such my work has added 
to the understanding of the immediate impact of financial crisis, the economy cycle 
and the measures taken by the government to battle the crisis.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
sector” - bringing world unemployment above 200 million for the first time. (Reuters, 2008) 
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7.0 CONCLUSION 
 
According to Leong (2008), there are early signal of weak loans growth. Slow down 
in major economies starting to impact Malaysia. [7] Exports to USA, China, Hong 
Kong and Australia has declined,[8] mainly due to lower exports of electrical and 
electronic (E&E) products and commodities (refined and crude petroleum as well as 
palm oil).  
 
 In tandem with the fall in exports, Malaysia’s total imports in October 2008 
declined 5.3% YoY and 7.8% MoM on reduced imports of capital goods and 
intermediate goods. While the lower imports of intermediate goods (bulk of which are 
E&E products) is directly linked to the slowing exports, the decline in imports of 
capital goods is perhaps a signal that businesses have turned cautious and are cutting 
back on their investment plans. Leong (2008) had also pointed that weak external 
sector will dampen banks’ outlook, i.e. the latest trade numbers re-affirms that the 
rapid deterioration in the external sector would drag down Malaysia’s GDP growth, 
resulting in sharply lower loans growth.[9] 
  
Based on Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER) Quarterly Surveys 
(2008), Malaysian economy has been resilient in the first-half of 2008, however, it is 
increasingly being affected by the global downturn. GDP growth has moderated to 
6.3% in 2Q08 after a strong 7.1 per cent gain in 1Q08, bringing growth to a high 
average of 6.7% in the first-half. The growth was driven by high commodity prices, 
strong private consumption and steady investment, partly supported by fiscal 
spending. Malaysia has been increasingly feeling the shock from the slowing US 
                                                          
7
 According to data released by Malaysia’s Statistics Department on 4 December 2008, Malaysia’s 
exports in October fell 2.6% from a year ago and a sharp 14.2% as compared to September 2008. 
8
 Malaysia’s exports to the USA fell 19% to RM6.44bil from RM7.94bil in October 2007 mainly due 
to lower exports of E&E products. Exports to China were down 7% YoY to RM4.89bil on lower 
exports of palm oil, crude rubber, manufactures of metal and refined petroleum products. Singapore, 
the USA, Japan, China, and Thailand were the top five export destinations, accounting for 51.7% of 
Malaysia’s total exports in October 2008. 
9
 Notwithstanding the moderation in loans growth in September and October 2008, a year-to-date 
increase of 11.1% indicates that the domestic banking industry is set to close 2008 with loans growth 
of approximately 11%. The outlook for 2009 is far less sanguine and Leong (2008) has factored in 
loans growth of 3% for most banking stocks under AmResearch’s coverage, which is deemed more 
conservative than the 5%-6% growth that some banks are guiding for. 
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economy through trade and investment linkages. The external downturn has not 
reached bottom yet. The US economy is on the brink of a recession, Japan has 
reported a contraction and Europe is coming to a standstill. Singapore has gone into 
recession in 3Q08 based on quarter-on-quarter growth. 
 
 However, BNP Paribas (2008) does not expecting a repeat of the NPL nightmares 
that Malaysian banks faced during the last financial crisis because the corporate 
balance sheets and Malaysian Banks are in better shape now than during the Asian 
Financial Crisis. During the Asian Crisis, the balance sheets of corporates were bad 
and this had a negative effect on the finance sector through rising NPL. Furthermore, 
Bank Negara’s accommodative monetary policy, lower interest rates and inflation 
easing means that NPL is not likely to be rise to alarmingly high levels. 
 
 As our banking system is much stronger now as compared to the Asian Crisis 
1997, as evidenced by the low NPL ratio, relatively low LD ratio and our balance of 
payment as been in surplus for almost 10 years, these factors will definitely help to 
cushion our economy from the Wall Street fall out. The main problem we face now is 
the structure of our economy which is highly dependent on external trade. The short 
term flow of fund in and out of our country may present limited risk, as most of these 
funds have left the country earlier because of the political uncertainty.  
 
Although there are several potential risks resultant from the financial crisis, 
undoubtedly there is also existence of opportunities for investor to take. 
 
8.0 LIMITATION 
 
1. The study is not including the earlier financial crisis happened way back in 
1980s, 1970s, 1960s, etc. The structure of the financial system may change over 
time in response to changing financial tools and regulation in the country.  
2.  The lack of detailed literature on the opportunities which could be arose from 
the financial crisis remains an obstacle to a more refined analysis.  
3.  Immediate impact of the current financial crisis on Malaysia banking system is 
not significant in 2008 due to time lag. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 1b: Banking Industry NPL, Loan Growth Vs. GDP Growth (2007-2008) 
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Figure 2a: Banking Industry Loans Vs. Deposits (1997-1999) 
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Figure 2b: Banking Industry Loans Vs. Deposits (2007 -2008) 
 
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
900000
1000000
Jan,
07
Feb,
07
Mar,
07
Apr,
07
May,
07
Jun,
07
Jul,
07
Aug,
07
Sep,
07
Oct,
07
Nov,
07
Dec,
07
Jan,
08
Feb,
08
Mar,
08
Apr,
08
May,
08
Jun,
08
Jul,
08
Aug,
08
Sep,
08
Oct,
08
As at
R
M
 
M
il
0.68
0.7
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.8
Total Loans Total Deposits Loan - to - Deposit Ratio
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia 
 
 
 23 
Figure 4a: Banking Industry NPL & Loan Gowth Vs. CI / KLCI (1997-1999) 
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Source: Bank Negara Malaysia 
 
 
Figure 4b: Banking Industry NPL & Loan Gowth Vs. CI / KLCI (2007 – 2008) 
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Figure 5a: Banking Industry NPL & Loan Gowth Vs. CPI (1997-1999) 
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Figure 5b: Banking Industry NPL & Loan Gowth Vs. CPI (2007-2008) 
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Figure 6a: Banking Industry Loan-to-Deposit Vs. CI  /  KLCI (1997-1999) 
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Figure 6b: Banking Industry Loan-to-Deposit Vs. CI / KLCI (2007-2008) 
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Figure 7a: Banking Industry Loan-to-Deposit Vs. CPI (1997-1999) 
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Figure 7b: Banking Industry Loan-to-Deposit Vs. CPI (2007-2008) 
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Figure 8a: Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (CI) for the period from 1997 – 1999) 
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Figure 8b: Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (CI) for the period from 2007-2008)  
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Relevant figures / table sourced from Monetary and Financial Developments 
October 2008 - Highlights of the Press Release, Bank Negara Malaysia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Inflation moderated to 7.6% in October 
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